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1 Introduction
In many situations, principals need to predict how much effort agents will provide in
the future, which is both useful and difficult. Accurately predicting effort is useful
because it allows to make informed decisions. For example, when deciding to hire
an assistant, a financial manager would benefit from being able to know ex ante how
much effort and diligence the candidate will put into the assigned work. Predicting
effort is difficult because the available information is often only weakly related to the
domain in which effort will be exerted. When hiring a person fresh out of college, one
can use average grades or grades in a specific subject, but they are likely to be noisy.
Ideally, one would rely on a proxy that is easy to collect but nevertheless predictive
of effort provision across different domains.
One candidate for such a proxy is confidence in one’s abilities. To the best of
our knowledge, a predictive relation of confidence in one domain on future effort
provision in another domain has not been tested so far. For example, would an
assistant’s confidence in her financial knowledge also predict her effort and diligence
in collecting and cleaning data required by the financial manager? To fill this gap, we
use a laboratory experiment and investigate whether individuals’ beliefs about their
proficiency in one domain (in our case, financial knowledge) predict their effort in
another domain (real-effort decoding task).
We measure individuals’ confidence as their beliefs about their performance in a
financial knowledge questionnaire1 and employ three different confidence measures:
self-assessed number of questions answered correctly, average probability assigned
by an individual that each of her answers is correct, and an incentive-compatible
confidence measure. In psychology, confidence (or self-efficacy) is typically measured
by means of directly asking people about their ability to perform a certain task (see
Bandura (2006) for a detailed guide on self-efficacy scales). For the first two measures
1We use a questionnaire on financial knowledge rather than on general knowledge because the
majority of our subjects are students with majors in Business or Economics.
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we follow this tradition and simply ask participants to state their beliefs about their
performance in the financial knowledge questionnaire both in terms of the self-assessed
number of correct answers and in terms of the probabilities that each of their answers
is correct. By contrast, the economics literature generally emphasizes the importance
of incentive-compatible measures.2 Our incentive-compatible confidence measure is in
line with this tradition. By design of our experiment, the participants are monetarily
worse-off by overstating or understating their financial knowledge and only receive a
reward when they state unbiased beliefs about their proficiency.
In the main part of the experiment, the participants choose how much to work
in a real-effort decoding task. We find that the participants with higher confidence
in their financial knowledge work more intensively in our real-effort task. Moreover,
both the self-assessed and the incentive-compatible measure of confidence are good
predictors of effort provision.
This result is important because in many field situations, self-assessed confidence
measures are easier and cheaper to collect than incentive-compatible ones.
The psychology literature has long emphasized confidence as the most important
factor in forming high performance expectations and in the propensity to work hard
to meet those expectations. Bandura (1982)). For example, Stajkovic and Luthans
(1998) provide a meta-analysis of psychology and management studies, which inves-
tigate the relation between confidence in a certain domain (or specific self-efficacy, an
individual’s belief in his or her ability to succeed in a specific task) and effort-related
performance in the same domain. They document a significant positive relationship
between confidence and performance, with the relationship being stronger for simple
tasks and tasks completed in the laboratory rather than in the field.
The recent economics literature investigates potential spillover effects of confi-
2For example, several papers on CEO overconfidence use personal managerial investments, specif-
ically net purchases of their company stock, their stock-option holdings, and the timing of option
exercises, as a proxy for managerial beliefs about their ability to create firm value (Huang and Kisgen
(2013), Deshmukh et al. (2013), Schrand and Zechman (2012), Hirshleifer et al. (2012), Galasso and
Simcoe (2011), Campbell et al. (2011), Billett and Qian (2008) and Malmendier and Tate (2005)).
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dence on effort provision (Gervais and Goldstein (2007), Falk et al. (2006), Bénabou
and Tirole (2002)). For example, Bénabou and Tirole (2002) demonstrate that high
confidence in one’s abilities improves welfare for individuals with time-inconsistent
preferences (e.g., hyperbolic discounting). In their model, decision makers in the
present prefer a self-confident version of themselves in the future because higher con-
fidence helps to resist the tendency to stop working too quickly. Falk et al. (2006)
confirm this intuition and show that individuals with low confidence about their abil-
ities abandon costly search much earlier than those with high confidence. Gervais
and Goldstein (2007) study a model of a firm where the marginal productivity of
individuals’ efforts is amplified by other team members’ efforts. In their model, the
presence of an agent, who overestimates his marginal productivity and therefore ex-
erts excessive effort, results in higher effort provision by his team members and a
Pareto-improvement for the whole team. In other words, the presence of a confident
agent helps to solve the free rider problem within a group. However, none of those
studies has investigated a relationship between confidence and effort across domains.
We also investigate a relation between exaggerated confidence, i.e. overconfidence,
and effort provision. We measure overconfidence in two different ways. Our first
measure is overestimation (or optimism) which describes a situation where individu-
als believe their ability, achievements, level of control, or probability of success to be
higher than they actually are. We define this measure as the difference between the
participants’ confidence in their performance and their actual performance. Our sec-
ond overconfidence measure is the better-than-average measure (aka overplacement)
that captures individuals’ beliefs that they are better than the others (Moore and
Healy (2008)). In our case, the better-than-average measure is a simple indicator
variable that equals one if a participant believes that she answered more questions
correctly than the average participant of our experiment, and zero otherwise. We
find that overconfidence, both in terms of overestimation and better-than-average,
positively predicts effort provision.
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These results help in interpreting the beneficial effects of confidence in social sig-
nalling, leadership, and risk taking. High confidence in one’s ability in one domain
can be used as a signal of future commitment and high effort provision in multiple
domains. For example, being a successful leader requires a non-trivial effort in mul-
tiple unrelated domains (e.g. coordinating the workload, motivating team members
to work at their full potential, creating a positive atmosphere, etc.). In line with
this notion, Reuben et al. (2012) show that confident individuals are more likely to
be selected as group leaders. Campbell et al. (2011) and Gervais et al. (2011) show
that boards of directors prefer moderately overconfident CEOs to their diffident or
highly overconfident peers because they are more motivated to take risky projects and
are committed to exert more effort to resolve uncertainty about those projects. Fur-
thermore, high confidence is important and beneficial in terms of pursuing new ideas
(Hirshleifer et al. (2012), Galasso and Simcoe (2011), Simon and Houghton (2003))
and implementing entrepreneurial projects (Hayward et al. (2010), Hayward et al.
(2006)) where both failure rates and uncertainty about future outcomes are high.
Both innovation and entrepreneurship require substantial and extended effort in var-
ious areas. Our results suggest that cross-domain effort exertion can be predicted
from confidence in just one (and potentially unrelated) area.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details the experimental
design. The results are provided in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
The experiment consists of two parts. In the initial part, we assess subjects’ self-
confidence in and actual knowledge of the financial domain. In the main part, sub-
jects choose how much they want to work in a real-effort decoding task where their




In the main part of the experiment subjects choose how much they want to work by
selecting an effort level in a real-effort task. They have to decode a list of 30 long
numbers and assign each number to one of several groups based on the last three digits
of each number (see Figure 1). The number of groups in this menial task determines
the intensity level: the list of 30 long numbers can be generated from 2 (the lowest
intensity level of 20% or level 1), 4, 6, 8, or 10 (the highest intensity level of 100%
or level 5) different groups. Subjects can choose their effort level by deciding on the
intensity level and the corresponding number of groups from which to decode. For
example (see Figure 1), if the long codes are generated from 4 different groups, their
last three digits may come from intervals [300-399], [0-99], [600-699], and [700-799],
where the exact interval choice is random and varies across subjects. Then, a subject
would need to assign all the 30 long codes ending with numbers between 300 and 399
to group 1, the ones ending with numbers between 0 and 99 to group 2, etc.
The subjects’ reward increases with their effort level from 1030 cents for the lowest
effort level of 20% to 1450 cents for the highest effort level of 100% (see Panel A of
Table 1 for the reward structure). To insure deliberate choices, subjects are trained to
perform the task at different intensity levels before making the choices that actually
matter for payment. Irrespective of their chosen effort level, all subjects have to
assign all the 30 long numbers to their correct groups to receive the reward; in other
words subjects cannot choose the highest effort level of 100%, decode only a few
numbers, and receive 1450 cents. To make sure that some of the subjects do not
take forever to complete the task, we give them extra 50 cents for finishing the task
within 150s.3 Before they start the task, subjects have to answer five comprehension
questions about the task and the reward structure. If they give a wrong answer or if
3If anything, this design feature may make some subjects more conservative in their effort choices,
i.e. they would have choosen higher effort levels if given unlimited time. However, any significant
interference seems unlikely because 50 cents is less than 5% of the total reward even for the lowest
effort level of 20%. In fact, 67% of our subjects finish the task within the given time.
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Figure 1: The Decoding Task
The screen shot presents a task for the effort level of 40%, which corresponds to decoding 30 long
numbers into 4 different groups, based on their last three digits.
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Table 1: Reward in the Real Effort and Incentivized Confidence Tasks
Panel A shows subjects’ reward depending on their effort level in the main
task. Panel B shows subjects’ reward depending on their effort level and their
skill level in the Incentivized Confidence task. To earn a reward, subjects must
choose an effort level corresponding to their actual skill; otherwise they earn zero.
Panel A: Decoding Task
Effort level 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Reward 1030 1190 1350 1400 1450
Panel B: Incentivized Confidence Task
Effort level Skill 1 Skill 2 Skill 3 Skill 4 Skill 5
20% 1350 0 0 0 0
40% 0 1350 0 0 0
60% 0 0 1350 0 0
80% 0 0 0 1350 0
100% 0 0 0 0 1350
they have questions, they receive additional explanations. The task starts when all
the subjects answer all the questions correctly.
2.2 Measures of Confidence
Before performing the effort task (see above), subjects answer 20 financial knowledge
questions4 by choosing between two alternative options (see Appendix A). For our
main confidence measure, we ask subjects how many out of 20 questions they think
they answered correctly. The exact question is “You were asked to answer 20 financial
knowledge questions. For how many of these questions do you think you gave the
correct answer? (State a number between 0 and 20.)”5 We also employ two additional
confidence measures frequently used in the literature for robustness.
When answering the financial knowledge questionnaire, subjects also assign a
4Among others, our questions include those proposed by Van Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2011).
We also include three questions from the cognitive reflection task by Frederick (2005).
5Subjects also answer the following question: “Other students were asked the same 20 financial
knowledge questions. For an average student in this experiment how many answers do you think
were correct? (State a number between 0 and 20).” We use this question to assess whether subjects
believe that their performance is above average.
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Table 2: Number of Correct Answers and Skill Level
Number of correct answers 11 or less 12 or 13 14 or 15 16 or 17 18 or more
Skill level 1 2 3 4 5
probability to the chosen answer being correct. The probability is restricted to vary
between 50% and 100% because there are only two alternative answers for each ques-
tion. Our second confidence measure is the average of the probabilities that a subject
has assigned to her answers.
Incentivized Confidence Measure
Our third confidence measure is elicited in an incentive-compatible manner. Once
subjects finish the financial knowledge questionnaire, their knowledge or skill level
in the financial domain is determined according to Table 2. Subjects do not know
their performance in the questionnaire but they are shown Table 2 that enables them
to form a belief about the number of correct answers they gave and about their
corresponding skill level. We elicit subjects’ beliefs about their skill level by asking
them to choose an effort level in our real-effort task that corresponds to their presumed
performance in the questionnaire (see Panel B of Table 1). If they choose the effort
level that corresponds to their actual skill level, they obtain a reward of 1350 cents,
otherwise they obtain nothing. For example, to receive a reward, a subject with skill
level 1 should choose the 20% effort level, a subject with skill level 2 should choose the
40% effort level, etc. To guarantee that all subjects face identical incentives to assess
their skill level correctly (they all receive the same reward for being right and they
all bear the same costs for being wrong), all of them have to perform the decoding
task at the same intensity level of 60%, irrespective of the effort level they choose.
By design, subjects are worse-off by overstating or understating their skill level in the




Ninety students have participated in a 75-minutes long laboratory experiment, coded
in Z-tree (Fischbacher (2007)) at the CentERLab of Tilburg University, the Nether-
lands. The average participant was 22 years old; there were 42 women; and 71 par-
ticipants had majors in Business and Economics. The average earnings constituted
about 13 Euros (or about $17 at the time of the experiment).
3.1 Financial Knowledge and Confidence
Table 3 reports subjects’ performance in the financial knowledge questionnaire, their
confidence in the financial domain, and their effort in the decoding task for skill lev-
els from 1 to 5. On average, the subjects answer 66.5% of the financial knowledge
questions correctly (as measured by the variable Financial Knowledge), which corre-
spond to 13.3 out of 20 questions (see Table 3). However, they believe that they have
answered 14.1 or 70.5% of questions correctly according to our main confidence mea-
sure. The mean difference between Self-Assessed # of Correct Answers and Financial
Knowledge is 4.0% and it is significantly different from zero at the 1% significance
level. So, as one may have expected, the participants of our experiment are not only
confident in their financial abilities, they are overconfident.6 The subjects’ confidence
in their financial knowledge is even higher according to our probability-based confi-
dence measure. According to the Average Probability measure, the subjects believe
that on average they have answered 16.9 or 84.5% questions correctly. The mean
difference between Average Probability and Financial Knowledge is 18.0% and it is
significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level.
One may argue that giving a higher score for the first two measures is free and sim-
ply makes subjects feel better about themselves. However, providing strong incentives
6For example, in their summary of the micro foundations of behavioural finance, De Bondt and
Thaler (1994) state that “perhaps the most robust finding in the psychology of judgment is that
people are overconfident” (p. 389).
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Table 3: Financial Knowledge, Confidence, and Effort
Panel A presents the summary statistics for the subjects’ performance in the financial knowledge
questionnaire, their confidence, and effort by the subjects’ skill level. Panel B presents the correla-
tions between the above mentioned variables. * stands for p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, and *** for
p < 0.01.
Panel A. Summary statistics by skill level
Skill Level All 1 2 3 4 5 4&5− 1
# of Subjects 90 21 26 23 16 4 -
Financial Knowledge 66.5 47.6 62.3 73.0 82.5 91.3 36.6∗∗
Self-Assessed # 70.5 66.7 66.5 71.7 76.6 85.0 11.6∗∗
of Correct Answers
Average Probability 84.5 84.5 81.8 84.4 88.1 89.1 3.7
Self-Assessed Skill 3.01 2.86 2.54 3.17 3.50 4.00 0.7
Effort 3.84 3.76 3.88 3.83 3.88 4.00 0.14
Panel B. Correlation Matrix
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) Financial Knowledge -
(2) Self-Assessed # 0.43∗∗∗ -
of Correct Answers
(3) Average Probability 0.18∗ 0.57∗∗∗ -
(4) Self-Assessed Skill 0.30∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ -
(5) Skill 0.96∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.19∗ 0.30∗∗∗ -
(6) Effort 0.07 0.27∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.20∗ 0.04 -
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to correctly assess their performance does not remove the subjects’ overconfidence as
shown by our third confidence measure, Self-Assessed Skill. The subjects believe that
their average skill level is 3.01 (out of 5.00), which is significantly higher than their
actual skill level of 2.51 (t = 3.56, p < 0.001). Note that the subjects receive zero
monetary reward if they are too optimistic or too pessimistic about their skill level.
Thus, even though the subjects are provided with substantial monetary incentives to
assess their performance objectively, they remain over-optimistic about their financial
knowledge.
3.2 Effort Provision
According to Table 3, the subjects’ average effort choice is equal to 3.84 (intensity
levels ranging from 1 to 5) and it is significantly below 5 (t = 11.16, p < 0.001),
indicating that subjective effort cost is non-trivial in our experimental task. It is
worth noting that the subjects’ effort choice is not affected by their actual knowledge
in the financial domain: the effort level does not change significantly across different
skill levels: the average effort levels for skill level 1 and skill level 5 are not statistically
different from each other. Moreover, Financial Knowledge and Skill are not correlated
with the Effort variable (see Panel B, Table 3). In other words, the subjects’ effort
choice is not affected by their actual knowledge in the financial domain.
Next, we address the question whether effort provision can be predicted with
confidence measures from a different domain. Most importantly, the Effort variable
is positively correlated with all the three confidence measures, Self-Assessed # of
Correct Answers, Average Probability, and Self-Assessed Skill, even though the real-
effort task is completely unrelated to financial knowledge. Thus, subjects’ confidence
or their beliefs about their financial skills rather than their actual financial skills are
predictive of effort provision.
To confirm further that confidence increases effort provision, we compare effort












































The figure presents the average effort choice for the subjects with low and high confidence levels;
vertical bars depict average effort levels and vertical lines represent 10% standard errors.
and top terciles). According to Figure 2, the subjects with high confidence choose
to work more than those with low confidence. The difference in effort levels is sig-
nificant within the 10% significance level for all three confidence measures: for the
Self-Assessed # of Correct Answers measure the t-statistic is equal to 2.40, with a
p-value of 0.02; for Average Probability the t-statistic is 1.99 (p = 0.05); for Self-
Assessed Skill the t-statistic is 1.93 (p = 0.06).
3.3 Multivariate Analysis
We further characterize the relationship between confidence and effort choice in a
multivariate setting. The dependent variable is Effort and the explanatory variables
are the three different confidence measures, the subjects’ actual skill level, and their
personal characteristics. The results are reported in Table 4.
In model (1), we use Self-Assessed # of Correct Answers as the only explanatory
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variable to predict the subjects’ effort choice in our real-effort task. We find that
the subjects with higher confidence in their financial knowledge work harder in the
unrelated domain of decoding. In model (2) we add the actual subjects’ skill level and
their personal characteristics as explanatory variables.7 We control for the following
subject characteristics: gender (a dummy variable equal to 1 for female subjects; 0
otherwise), age (in years), nationality8 (a dummy variable for subjects who indicate
that they grew up in the People’s Republic of China; 0 otherwise), and study major
(a dummy variable equal to 1 for subjects with majors in Business or Economics;
0 otherwise). None of the additional controls9 seem to explain the subjective effort
choice in a persistent and significant manner. Most importantly, the coefficient for
the confidence measure remains unchanged.
In models (3) and (4), we use Average Probability and Self-Assessed Skill as alter-
native measures of the subjects’ confidence in their financial knowledge. According
to both models, the two measures of confidence are positively related to the subjects’
effort choice; also both measures are significant in the regression models with (Table
4) and without (not shown) controls. Thus, irrespective of the specific measure used,
confidence in financial knowledge predicts effort provision in a task that is unrelated
to this knowledge, whereas the actual financial knowledge does not.
7Despite a positive and significant correlation between the variables Self-Assessed # of Correct
Answers and Skill, there is no multicollinearity problem in model (2); the average VIF is only 1.17.
8Several studies point out that in comparison with many Western cultures, the Chinese culture
emphasizes the importance of effort and persistence in achieving goals (Leung (2010), Chen and Uttal
(1988)). For example, according to Chen and Uttal (1988), while “innate ability may determine the
rate at which one acquires new knowledge, the ultimate level of achievement is attained through
effort.”
9As further robustness tests, we add some more explanatory variables in the multivariate re-
gression. We measure subjects’ risk aversion via the Holt and Laury (2002) task and cognitive
reflection score (CRS) via questions by Frederick (2005). Both risk aversion and CRS variables are
insignificant and do not affect our main result.
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Table 4: Impact of Confidence on Effort Choice
The table reports the results of OLS regression models for the subjects’ effort level choice. The
dependent variable is Effort, the subjects’ effort level, exerted in the experimental real-effort task.
The explanatory variables are the three different measures of confidence, subjects’ actual skill level,
and subjects’ personal characteristics.
* stands for p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, and *** for p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Dependent variable Effort
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Self-Assessed # 0.024∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗





Skill -0.050 0.020 -0.004
(0.098) (0.093) (0.096)
Female -0.136 -0.159 -0.206
(0.209) (0.213) (0.210)
Age -0.005 -0.009 -0.001
(0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
Chinese 0.369 0.307 0.406
(0.240) (0.251) (0.244)
Major in Business -0.332 -0.315 -0.284
or Economics (0.256) (0.261) (0.260)
Constant 2.141∗∗∗ 2.475∗∗∗ 2.099∗ 3.583∗∗∗
(0.645) (0.932) (1.225) (0.793)
Observations 90 90 90 90
Adj. R2 0.065 0.065 0.031 0.027
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3.4 Overconfidence and Effort
The previous literature shows that too much confidence (i.e. overconfidence) can
be detrimental for individual decision making.10 In our case, there may be limits
to the beneficial effects of confidence on real effort provision. We therefore investi-
gate whether subjects’ effort choice is affected by their overconfidence. Following the
standard definition (see for example, Moore and Healy (2008)), we capture overconfi-
dence as the difference between the subjects’ beliefs about their financial knowledge
(i.e. confidence) and their actual knowledge.11 In particular, we measure overcon-
fidence in four different ways. OC1 is the difference between the number of correct
answers a subject believes she gave (Self-Assessed # of Correct Answers) and the
actual number of correct answers, in percentage points. OC2 is the difference be-
tween the probability-based confidence measure (Average Probability) and the actual
number of correct answers, in percentage points. OC3 is the difference between the
subjects’ incentive-compatible skill level (Self-Assessed Skill) and their actual skill
level. Finally, Better-than-Average (BtA) is a dummy variable, equal to 1 for those
subjects who believe that their performance in the financial knowledge questionnaire
is higher than the average performance of others; 0 otherwise. We regress the sub-
jects’ effort choice on different overconfidence measures, their actual skill level, and
their personal characteristics. The results are reported in Table 5.
We find that three out of four overconfidence measures are positively and signifi-
cantly related to the subjects’ effort choice. OC1 and BtA have the highest explana-
tory power in terms of adjusted R-squared (see models (1) and (4)). So, not only
the degree to which subjects overestimate their ability relative to their actual ability
but also relative to the ability of others can positively affect their propensity to exert
10The detrimental effects of overconfidence range from value-destroying decisions of CEOs (Desh-
mukh et al. (2013), Schrand and Zechman (2012), Malmendier and Tate (2008), Hayward and
Hambrick (1997)) to poor decision quality of VCs (Zacharakis and Shepherd (2001)) and to poor
investor performance (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009), Barber and Odean (2001)).
11Note that this definition allows also for underconfidence when subjects hold inferior beliefs
about their knowledge in comparison to their actual knowledge.
15
Table 5: Impact of Overconfidence on Effort Choice
The table reports the results of OLS regression models for the subjects’ effort level choice. The
dependent variable is Effort and the main explanatory variables are four different measures of over-
confidence. OC1 is the difference between Self-Assessed # of Correct Answers and the actual number
of correct answers, in percentage points. OC2 is the difference between Average Probability and the
actual number of correct answers, in percentage points. OC3 is the difference between Self-Assessed
Skill and Skill, the actual skill level. BtA is a dummy variable, equal 1 for those subjects who believe
that their performance in the financial knowledge questionnaire is higher than the performance of
others; 0 otherwise. * stands for p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, and *** for p < 0.01. Standard errors
are in parentheses.









Skill 0.198 0.181 0.169 0.011
(0.121) (0.158) (0.120) (0.093)
Female -0.191 -0.220 -0.206 -0.122
(0.209) (0.212) (0.210) (0.215)
Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.008
(0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Chinese 0.373 0.353 0.406 0.341
(0.244) (0.253) (0.244) (0.245)
Major in Business -0.285 -0.269 -0.284 -0.356
or Economics (0.258) (0.262) (0.260) (0.262)
Constant 3.528*** 3.400*** 3.583*** 3.922***
(0.789) (0.874) (0.793) (0.777)
Observations 90 90 90 90
Adj. R2 0.041 0.007 0.027 0.042
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effort in our real-effort task.
4 Conclusion
Our study extends the notion that self-confidence is a valuable individual trait. Our
findings suggest that high confidence in one domain (financial knowledge) is predic-
tive of real-effort provision in a completely different domain (a laborious task, the
piece-meal decoding of a list of numbers). Thus, subjects with high confidence in
their financial proficiency tend to work more than their peers with low confidence
in an unrelated real-effort task. In our experiment, we employ three different mea-
sures of confidence: self-assessed number of correct answers in the financial knowl-
edge questionnaire, the average probability that given answers are correct, and an
incentive-compatible confidence measure. Each of the three measures is positively re-
lated to the subjects’ real effort. Our results are robust when controlling for a set of
subject characteristics, including gender, age, nationality, study major, risk-aversion,
and cognitive reflection score. In conclusion, the present study may provide leads
for investigating whether simple confidence measures could be used as predictors of
real-effort provision in different settings.
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Appendix A Financial Knowledge Questionnaire
The appendix presents twenty financial knowledge questions with two alternative answers each; the
correct answer is in bold.
1. Inflation may create problems in many ways. Which group would have the greatest problem
during periods of high inflation that last several years? (i) Older people living on fixed
retirement income; (ii) Young working couples with children and a mortgage.
2. If interest rates rise, what will typically happen to bond prices? (i) Fall; (ii) Rise.
3. Buying a single company’s stock usually provides (i) a safer return than a stock mutual fund;
(ii) a riskier return than a stock mutual fund.
4. Justin just found a job with a take-home pay of e2,000 per month. He must pay e800 for
rent and e200 for groceries each month. He also spends e200 per month on transportation. If
he budgets e100 each month for clothing, e150 for restaurants and e250 for everything else,
how long will it take him to accumulate savings of e900. (Assume no interest rate payment
on savings). (i) 3 months; (ii) 5 months.
5. A young person with $100,000 to invest should hold riskier financial investment than an older
person with $100,000 to invest. (i) True; (ii) False.
6. In investor wants to buy a house but does not have sufficient funds. He invests in a risky
project and his investment (including the returns) doubles in size every quarter. If it takes
48 quarters to reach the necessary funds to purchase the house, how many quarters would it
take to have sufficient funds to purchase half of the house? (i) 24 quarters; (ii) 47 quarters.
7. Scott and Eric are young men. Each has a good credit history. They work at the same
company and make approximately the same salary. Scott has borrowed e6,000 to take a
foreign vacation. Eric has borrowed e6,000 to buy a car. Who is likely to pay the lowest
finance charge? (i) Eric will pay less because the car is collateral for the loan; (ii)
They will both pay the same because consumer credits have the same interest rate.
8. Elena started her pension program at age 20 and put in e2,000 each year for 15 years. Rebecca
started her pension program at age 35 and put in e2,000 each year for 30 years. If they both
get 6% per year on their investments, who will have more money at age 65? (i) Elena; (ii)
Rebecca.
9. Employees should have the majority of their retirement funds in their current employers stock.
(i) True; (ii) False.
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10. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to
make 100 widgets? (i) 5 minutes; (ii) 100 minutes.
11. It is possible for investors to be diversified even if they invest all their money in one mutual
fund. (i) True; (ii) False.
12. You should rather have $5,000 or a Euro cent doubled every day for a month? (i) True; (ii)
False.
13. Yolanda has three credit cards and she owes e500 on each of them. The interest rates are 7%
for card A, 9% for card B and 8% for card C. If Yolanda has e1,000 to pay some of her debt,
which cards should she pay if she wants to minimize future interest payments? (i) e500 to
card B and e500 to card C; (ii) e333 to card A and e334 to card B and e333 to card C.
14. How do income taxes affect the income that people have to spend? (i) They decrease spendable
income in deflationary times and increase spendable income in inflationary times. (ii) They
decrease the amount of goods and services that can be purchased.
15. A bat and a ball cost 1.10 Euro in total. The bat cost 1 Euro more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost? (i) 0.10 Euro; (ii) 0.05 Euro.
16. At takeovers, the bidding firm usually pays a large premium to the target firm. Therefore,
upon announcement, the target firm’s share price increases substantially as it anticipates the
premium to be paid in the takeover. Hence, if you own shares of a target firm (before the an-
nouncement), you will very likely make a large profit if you sell them after the announcement.
(i) True; (ii) False.
17. You invest e1000 in a project and the discount factor is 10%. The return is expected to
be e1100 in year 1 and e1200 in year 2 (when the project ends). The net present value is
approximately: (i) e1000; (ii) e1300.
18. If you have to sell one of your stocks, you should sell one which has gone up in price rather
than one which has gone down. (i) True; (ii) False.
19. To do well in the stock market, you should buy and sell your stocks often. (i)True; (ii) False.
20. The cost of capital of the average listed firm consists is about (i) 10%; (ii) 20%.
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